How Puzzles of Petitionary Prayer Solve Themselves: Divine Omnirationality, Interest-Relative Explanation, and Answered Prayer by Johnson, Daniel M.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 37 Issue 2 Article 1 
4-1-2020 
How Puzzles of Petitionary Prayer Solve Themselves: Divine 
Omnirationality, Interest-Relative Explanation, and Answered 
Prayer 
Daniel M. Johnson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Johnson, Daniel M. (2020) "How Puzzles of Petitionary Prayer Solve Themselves: Divine Omnirationality, 
Interest-Relative Explanation, and Answered Prayer," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of 
Christian Philosophers: Vol. 37 : Iss. 2 , Article 1. 
DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.1 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol37/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
pp.137–157 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 37 No. 2 April 2020
doi: 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.1
All rights reserved
HOW PUZZLES OF PETITIONARY PRAYER SOLVE 
THEMSELVES: DIVINE OMNIRATIONALITY, 
INTEREST-RELATIVE EXPLANATION, AND 
ANSWERED PRAYER
Daniel M. Johnson
Some have seen in the divine attribute of omnirationality, identified by 
Alexander R. Pruss, the promise of a dissolution of the usual puzzles of peti-
tionary prayer. Scott Davison has challenged this line of thought with a series 
of example cases. I will argue that Davison is only partially correct, and that 
the reasons for this reveal an important new way to approach the puzzles of 
petitionary prayer. Because explanations are typically interest-relative, there 
is not one correct account of “answered prayer” but many, corresponding to 
a variety of reasons to care whether God might answer our prayers. It follows 
from this that the omnirationality solution can be vindicated and that puz-
zles of petitionary prayer that are not dissolved thereby will typically contain 
within themselves the seeds of their own solutions.
1. Introduction
One of the most interesting and significant contributions to philosophical 
theology in recent years is Alexander Pruss’s argument that God exhibits a 
property called omnirationality: when God acts, he doesn’t just act on some 
of the reasons there are for him to do what he does, but on all of them. One 
consequence of this is that it becomes very easy to identify at least some 
of God’s reasons for acting as he does: if God does Y, and X is a reason for 
him to do Y, then he did Y at least in part on the basis of X. That matters for 
a number of debates in philosophical theology. One of them is the debate 
over petitionary prayer. It turns out that it is easy to identify when God 
does things at least in part for the reason that I prayed for them: if I gen-
uinely asked for X, and X is a good thing, then my request is a reason for 
God to bring X about; and so if God actually brings X about, then he did 
so at least in part on the basis of my request.1
applyparastyle "fig//caption/p[1]" parastyle "FigCapt"
applyparastyle "fig" parastyle "Figure"
1I’ll discuss in a moment the possibility that only certain kinds of requests—perhaps 
requests with a certain motive, or by people with a certain relationship with or standing 
before God—generate a reason for God to grant the request, which is more restrictive than 
what Pruss thinks. Also, another qualification is that Pruss allows that some reasons are 
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Pruss stops short of claiming that this solves any of the well-known puz-
zles for the practice of petitionary prayer, and even refrains from claiming 
that it constitutes an analysis of what it is for God to “answer” prayer, 
which might contribute to solving the puzzles of petitionary prayer.2 But 
these reflections do, at least on their face, seem to suggest a way to dis-
solve the typical puzzles of petitionary prayer. The usual challenges to 
the practice of petitionary prayer assume that for petitionary prayer to 
be successful—to be “answered”—it would need to be able to make the 
difference as to whether God brings about the object of the request or not.3 
The challenges find various things objectionable about the idea that our 
requests could make the difference as to whether God does something, the 
most common of which is based on the thought that a perfect God would 
do the best thing regardless of whether he is asked. Defenses of petition-
ary prayer typically share the assumption and simply try to make plau-
sible the idea that prayers could make the difference as to whether God 
does something.4 Pruss’s reflections on divine omnirationality suggest a 
different kind of defense, one that challenges the assumption that for peti-
tionary prayers to be successful, to be “answered,” they have to make the 
difference as to whether God does what is requested. Perhaps it is enough 
that our requests make a difference in the sense that they are one of God’s 
reasons for acting, even if they don’t make the difference in the sense of 
constituting a tipping point that takes God from not acting to acting. And 
omnirationality entails that it is easy for our requests to make a difference 
in that way, because so long as the request actually gives God a reason to 
act, he acts at least in part on the basis of that request.
So it is unsurprising that some philosophers have seen in Pruss’s reflec-
tions on omnirationality the promise of a dissolution of the usual puzzles 
excluded for God by other reasons he might have; for instance, if he has promised to do 
something, then he is committed to ignoring (excluding) reasons not to do it. All of the plau-
sible cases of such a thing, however, don’t apply to things God actually does; cases where 
reasons to do what he actually does are excluded involve some rather unlikely types of 
promises, or involve a deontic rules like the requirement not to use evil means for good ends 
which don’t seem to apply to prayers that generate a reason for God to act, and so can be 
safely ignored for our purposes. See Pruss, “Omnirationality,” 3–4 for discussion.
2See Davison, Petitionary Prayer, 34n19.
3I will follow Scott Davison in distinguishing between God’s “replying to” a prayer—
where the reply might be “no”—and God’s “answering” prayer, which entails that God 
brought about what was requested, so the answer is “yes.” These can be thought of as two 
types of answer, but I will follow him in restricting “answer” to the latter type. See Davison, 
Petitionary Prayer, 10.
4The one exception of which I am aware is Cohoe, “God, Causality, and Petitionary Prayer.” 
His view foreshadows the Pruss-style omnirationality solution to the puzzles of petitionary 
prayer. This essay goes beyond Cohoe’s solution both in its appeal to interest-relative expla-
nation to handle Davison’s objections to the omnirationality solution and in its treatment of 
the self-solving character of remaining puzzles of petitionary prayer, but is compatible with 
the view he defends in that essay. My way of handling Davison’s cases differs from his later 
attempt to do so (in Cohoe, “How Could Prayer Make a Difference?”), and in fact I disagree 
with his way of doing so, though I don’t think my response is incompatible with his.
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of petitionary prayer.5 Scott Davison challenges this line of thought. He 
argues, using a series of example cases, that even if Pruss’s reflections 
about omnirationality are correct and prayers automatically enter into 
God’s reasons for bringing about the object of the prayer, that fact is not 
sufficient to make it true that God answers those prayers when he brings 
about their object. In short, he argues that the assumption underlying the 
usual puzzles of petitionary prayer is correct: for a prayer to be successful, 
to be “answered,” it must in some way make the difference, or constitute 
the tipping point, for God to act as he does.6
I will argue that Davison is only partially correct, and that the reasons 
for this reveal an important new way to approach the puzzles of peti-
tionary prayer. In the first section, I will argue Davison’s cases do indi-
cate an underlying gap between the truth of divine omnirationality and 
the question of whether God answered a prayer that is based on the fact 
that explanation is often interest-relative. The answer to the question of 
whether God did something because I asked depends in part on my inter-
est in asking the question. There is not one answer but many, correspond-
ing with many different interests that might be reflected in the question. 
Therefore Davison is right that it does not follow from divine omniration-
ality that the answer to the question “did God answer my prayer?” when 
God did what I asked is always yes. However, I will argue in the second 
section, there is at least one sense of “answered prayer,” corresponding 
to one legitimate interest we have in asking whether God is answering 
our prayers, according to which divine omnirationality does entail that 
when we’ve asked for something good and God brings it about, God 
has answered our prayer. In other words, there is at least one sense of 
“answered prayer” which does not require the stronger difference-mak-
ing view of “answered prayer,” and which therefore escapes the usual 
puzzles of petitionary prayer. Finally, in the third section, I will discuss 
senses of “answered prayer” which do require that the prayer “makes the 
difference” in some stronger sense. I will argue that the debate over these 
looks quite different in light of divine omnirationality. I will argue that 
most ways of raising a puzzle of petitionary prayer will contain within 
themselves the seed of a solution to the puzzle—they will, in an important 
5Contributing to the attractiveness of this line of thought is its relatively low cost in terms 
of metaphysical commitments. It doesn’t seem to carry any beyond the commitments of 
omnirationality itself. Notably, it doesn’t carry a commitment to libertarian views of the will, 
and so it seems to dissolve the problems of petitionary prayer for theological determinism 
just as easily as for any other view of divine providence, which may surprise those who have 
thought the puzzles of petitionary prayer especially intractable for theological determinists. 
For a theologically determinist use of omnirationality to solve the puzzles of petitionary 
prayer, see Heath White, Fate and Free Will, 33–36. Relatedly, this line of thought could be 
thought of as one way of defending Thomas Aquinas’s account of answered prayer, which 
is criticized both by Stump in “Petitionary Prayer,” 86 and by Smith and Yip in “Partnership 
with God,” 397–399.
6He has his own gloss on difference-making; he rejects the common counterfactual char-
acterization of that idea in favor of a contrastive-reasons account. I’ll return to that later.
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way, be self-solving—and that it is therefore very unlikely that a puzzle of 
petitionary prayer will constitute a serious general problem for the prac-
tice of petitioning God.
One clarification is in order. There are two parts to the omnirational-
ity solution to the puzzles of petitionary prayer. The first part is just the 
claim that a prayer generates a reason for God to grant the request. The 
second part is the application of omnirationality itself: the claim that, if 
a prayer generates a reason for God to grant the request, then when God 
grants the request, he does it in part because of that reason. The second 
part is the key to solving the puzzles of petitionary prayer, because it is 
the gap between (a) a prayer giving God a reason to act and (b) God act-
ing because of the prayer that is the target of the puzzles of petitionary 
prayer—which, generally speaking, argue that God would have done 
what we asked anyway, or that for all we know God would have done 
what we asked anyway.7 It is the second part that Davison challenges 
with his objections. Because of that, I  will remain neutral on certain 
debates about the first part of the solution. Specifically, Pruss thinks that 
any request directed to God for something good generates a reason for 
God to grant the request, while Cohoe thinks that only requests made 
under certain conditions (those made “for an appropriate object . . . in 
a suitable sort of manner,” and which “fit with the nature of the rela-
tionship”) generate a reason for God to grant the request.8 Regardless of 
who is correct here—and, frankly, I’m unsure myself—the basic struc-
ture of the ominrationality solution to the puzzles of petitionary prayer 
will remain unchanged.9 In discussing the omnirationality solution in 
the rest of the essay, I  will try to refer to “prayers which generate a 
reason for God to grant the request” or some such formulation, so as 
to remain mostly neutral as to which conditions must be met for such a 
thing to occur.
7This is true even of Davison’s epistemic puzzle of petitionary prayer; see Davison, 
Petitionary Prayer, chapter 4.
8Cohoe, “God, Causality, and Petitionary Prayer,” 36.
9To elaborate on this point: suppose that there are pretty restrictive conditions on whether 
a request of God generates a reason for God to grant it; suppose that only requests from 
Christians (via the mediation of Jesus Christ) done respectfully and for pure motives give 
God a reason to act. In that case—assuming the rest of the omnirationality solution works—
the general puzzles of petitionary prayer are still defeated. I think the puzzles of petitionary 
prayer are supposed to be challenges to the religious practice of petitioning God in general, 
not just challenges to this or that petition. If the puzzles are solved under some conditions 
involving the attitudes of the petitioners, it is open to religious practitioners to strive to meet 
the conditions under which their prayers will be answered, and so the practice in general 
survives the puzzles. Now, the question of what conditions must be met for a request to 
generate a reason for God to act is still an interesting and very important question, but I think 
it is a distinct debate from the one that has up until now been conducted under the heading 
“the puzzles of petitionary prayer.” It is a debate that can be had among religious practition-
ers as to how to petition God most effectively, rather than a debate about whether the whole 
practice is misguided.
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2. The Gap Between Omnirationality and Answered Prayer
For God to answer my prayer is for God to bring about something because 
I prayed for it. Some clarifications are in order, but putting those to the 
side, the important element for our purposes is the “because,” the explan-
atory relationship.10 Pruss thinks, and Davison agrees (at least for the 
sake of argument), that because of divine omnirationality any prayer that 
gives God a reason to do X is one of the reasons that God acts on when 
doing X. Davison just doesn’t think that is sufficient for saying “God did X 
because I prayed for X.” Davison gives three cases where people are aware 
of a reason Y (given by someone’s request) for doing X, and the reason 
features into their decision, but nevertheless it seems wrong to say that 
they did X because of Y. What follows are brief summaries of each case.11
Tree-trimming. Imagine that my neighbor asks me to trim a tree on my 
property that hangs over his. Suppose his request matters a lot to me; 
I want to keep him happy. I also wanted to trim my tree to make it look 
better, but his request gives me a new reason at least as strong to trim the 
tree. I trim the tree; it seems proper to say that I did it because he asked 
me. But now imagine a variation: he asked me to trim the tree, but I am 
almost totally indifferent to his request. His request does give me a very 
slight reason to trim the tree, but I was going to do it anyway, and his 
reason plays hardly any role in my motivation. In that case, it is odd to 
say that I trimmed my tree because he asked me, despite the fact that his 
request did play, very slightly, into my motivational structure.
Letter to the mayor. A mayor of a city decides to repeal a city tax, mostly 
for reasons connected to the general good of the city. The tax has all sorts 
of bad effects, which vastly outweigh the good that it does. The mayor 
also receives a letter from a citizen requesting that the tax be repealed 
because of its bad effects on that citizen personally. The mayor does care 
about that citizen and gives the request some weight, but the weight is 
vanishingly small, and the mayor certainly would have repealed the tax 
whether the citizen had asked or not. In that case, it seems odd to say that 
the mayor repealed the tax because the citizen asked.
Divine conservation. This case is brief enough to quote the relevant sec-
tion: “Finally, suppose that God has a million strong reasons to sustain in 
existence the current world, the world in which you and I exist right now. 
Imagine that I pray that God would continue to sustain in existence this 
current world for the next five minutes, and that God does so. Should we 
say that God has answered my prayer? Had I not prayed, the incomplete, 
weighted list of all of God’s million strong reasons for sustaining in exist-
ence the current world would have remained unchanged (although the 
10One clarification is that I agree with Davison’s insistence that for God’s action to count 
as answering the prayer, it must be a response to the content of the prayer and not merely 
to the external circumstances in which the prayer is uttered, which clarifies the “because 
I prayed for it” clause. Davison, Petitionary Prayer, 31.
11The cases appear in Davison, Petitionary Prayer, 34–37.
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complete list of all of God’s reasons would have changed, if Pruss is right). 
Since my prayer carries virtually no weight in God’s decision to sustain 
in existence this current world over the past five minutes, we should not 
say that God has answered it, contrary to Pruss—his account requires too 
little.”12
It does seem to me that at least some of these cases are instances where 
it is wrong to say that someone “did X because of Y,” despite the fact that 
Y featured among that person’s reasons for doing X. (I will discuss the res-
ervations I have about some of the cases in more detail in the next section.) 
That is a strange phenomenon. What’s going on here? I offer the following 
explanation.
I take it that this phenomenon is caught up with the interest-relativ-
ity of explanation—of “why” questions and “because” statements. This 
applies to all sorts of different types of explanation, including causal 
explanations, final explanations in terms of reasons (which is the type rel-
evant here), and what I have elsewhere called “ontological” explanations, 
explanations of what something is or of what it is for something to be the 
case.13 With each of these types of explanation, it seems that there is one 
interest-independent explanation: the full or complete explanation. In the 
case of causal explanation of a proposition reporting an event, the full 
explanation would have to cite every factor in that event’s causal history; 
in the case of explanation in terms of reasons, the full explanation would 
have to cite every reason the agent had for taking the action; and so on. 
This full explanation seems to be objective and independent of anyone’s 
interests.
However, the full explanation of just about anything is unavailable to us, 
and mostly uninteresting in any case. That is why any given “why” question 
might be asked in a certain context or with a certain interest, which makes 
some aspects of the “full and ultimate” explanation relevant and others 
irrelevant. The context and the inquirer’s interests allow certain partial and 
non-ultimate explanations to stand in as a satisfactory answer to the “why” 
question, while disallowing others. For example, suppose that I decide to go 
to Little Caesars to pick up pizza for my family for dinner. The three-year-old 
asks “why are you going to Little Caesars?” and the six-year-old adds, “yeah, 
why are you going to Little Caesars?” I know what the six-year-old wants to 
know—he loves the cheese sticks at Papa John’s—and so I say “because Little 
Caesars is cheap.” The three-year-old looks confused; he says “but I want to 
wrestle!” I realize what he’s asking, and give him a different answer: “I’m 
going because it is time for dinner and we’re all hungry.” What has happened 
is that two different aspects of the full explanation of why I am going where 
I am are relevant because of the different interests of the inquirers. The answer 
that satisfies one won’t satisfy the other; what counts as a good explanation in 
the one context doesn’t count as a good explanation in the other.14
12Davison, Petitionary Prayer, 37.
13See, for example, Johnson, “B-theory Old and New.”
14Bas van Fraassen pointed out the interest-relativity of explanation in The Scientific Image.
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So Pruss’s thesis about omnirationality may be exactly right when we 
are talking about full or ultimate explanation—any prayer for X that con-
stitutes a reason for God to do X is part of the full and ultimate explanation 
of why he does X. Thus in the interest-independent sense of “because,” 
anytime God does what someone asks (when their request gives him a 
reason to do it), he does it in part because they asked. But Davison may 
well be correct as well: it doesn’t follow that in every such situation it 
is right to say that “God did X because you asked him to.” And some 
of Davison’s cases are perhaps good illustrations of this: they seem to be 
cases where only certain aspects of the full explanation are relevant, and 
where we seem to want to identify some stronger “difference-making” 
sense in which God did something because we asked.
This seems a blow to anyone hoping to use Pruss’s theses about divine 
omnirationality to dissolve the puzzles of petitionary prayer. But I think 
there is still hope for that project. Davison concludes on the basis of his 
cases that Y merely entering into one’s reasons for doing X is not sufficient 
for doing X because of Y. He infers that there must be some stronger crite-
rion for doing X because of Y which captures the stronger sense in which 
Y must somehow make the difference as to whether X is done. He (rightly, 
in my view) rejects the usual counterfactual test, according to which God 
did X because of request Y if he wouldn’t have done X unless request Y 
had been made. He offers in its place a new contrastive-reasons account, 
according to which God does X because of request Y if Y plays an essential 
role in a true contrastive explanation of why God did X rather than some-
thing else.15
What concerns me about this pattern of reasoning isn’t the details of 
the contrastive-reasons account of answered prayer; what concerns me 
is the fact that Davison landed on any restrictive interest-independent 
account of answered prayer at all. That, it seems to me, is not the lesson 
to be learned from Davison’s cases, if my explanation of why they suc-
ceed is accurate. Given that the thesis of divine omnirationality is true, the 
only interest-independent sort of explanation available entails that any-
one’s requests which generate a reason for God to grant them do indeed 
form part of why God does what is requested. If there are cases on which 
God did what was requested but it is nevertheless wrong to say that God 
answered a prayer that generated a reason for him to grant the request, 
then it must be because the context and the interests of the inquirer make 
it so the prayer is not a relevant answer to the why-question. But why think 
there would only be one set of interests or one context, such that a restric-
tive difference-making account of answered prayer would always be true? 
Perhaps there are many interests we might have in asking whether God 
has done what he did in response to our prayers, which would then gen-
erate many different senses in which it might be said that God answers 
prayer. And if so, perhaps there is at least one sense of “answered prayer” 
15This summarizes the argument of Chapter 2 of Davison, Petitionary Prayer, 24–42.
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—one interest we might have in asking “did God do that because of my 
prayer?”—according to which the most permissive answer that is allowed 
by divine omnirationality is in fact a relevant answer.
3. The Value Question
So far I’ve suggested the following. If the thesis of divine omnirationality 
is true, then a full explanation of God’s actions will involve reference to 
our requests that generate reasons for God to grant them, such that God 
brought those things about in part because we asked. This full explana-
tion is the only interest-independent explanation available. The question 
“why did God do that?” may nevertheless be asked in contexts and with 
interests that would render a reference to my prayer for what he did irrele-
vant, and so it would be false to say in that context that God answered my 
prayer or did it because I asked him to. We may have a variety of reasons 
that we care to inquire as to whether God did what he did in response 
to our requests, and so there will be a corresponding variety of senses of 
“answered prayer.”
If our goal is to try to figure out what is meant most often by “answered 
prayer,” we could look (as Davison does) at a series of cases and try to 
generalize from them. But I suggest that a more helpful approach would 
be to look directly at the factor that is deciding the different senses of 
“answered prayer”: the interests we have in asking whether God acted 
because of our requests. Once we realize that “answered prayer,” due to 
the “because” concept embedded in it, is interest-relative, it would make 
sense to immediately make the same kind of move that value-driven epis-
temologists do.16 Instead of assuming we’re clear in our own minds about 
what “answered prayer” is in any given case and consulting our intuitions 
about cases, we instead ask: why should we care whether our prayers are 
answered? What kinds of relationships between our requests and God’s 
actions matter, and why? It may be that there is more than one kind of 
relationship between my requests and God’s actions that matters—and so 
there may be more than one important sense of “answered prayer.”
I want to pursue this value-driven approach to the question of answered 
prayer in the remainder of the essay. In this section, I want to identify a 
type of relationship between our requests and God’s actions which mat-
ters—that is, which is a legitimate focus of our interest—and which, in 
combination with divine omnirationality, licenses the easy answer to the 
question of whether God answers prayer that dissolves the typical puz-
zles of petitionary prayer.
One major good of prayer is that it allows God to involve us in what 
he is doing. Call this the good of involvement in God’s activities. He’s the 
primary agent; the projects are his. But he dignifies us when he involves 
us in those projects, which he of course (typically) could do without us. 
16For an example of value-driven epistemology, see Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and 
the Pursuit of Understanding.
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In other words, even if I’m an invalid stuck in my house, I want to be a 
part of what God is doing in the world, however small my part is.17 If that 
is my interest, then what matters is not whether my prayer “made the 
difference”; what matters is that God took what I asked him into account, 
that I got to be “part of the team,” even if God didn’t need me on the team. 
But then all I need to know is that my request was part of the reason he 
did what he did—it doesn’t matter how small a part, or even if he had 
conclusive reason to do it independently of my request. I got to be a part 
of what he did; my request gave him a reason, and he took that reason 
into account when he acted. So if this is my interest in asking whether God 
answered my prayer, the answer is basically the broadest one that divine 
omnirationality allows: if you asked for it in such a way that it gave God a 
reason to grant the request, and God did it, then God did it in part because 
you asked, and therefore God answered your prayer.18
There are common examples where this sort of involvement is all we 
want, and we think it matters enough that answers to “why” questions 
track it. All the examples I can think of have something to do with collective 
action or at least the actions involving groups of people (naturally enough, 
since the good in question is involvement in the activity of others, namely 
God’s activity). One sort of collective action is political action. Consider 
voting for president. Given the population of the United States, your vote 
never comes even close to “making the difference” as to who is elected. And 
some of our “because” statements track that fact: we can make sense of me 
saying to you “your vote for this president isn’t why he was elected” under 
some circumstances, namely those where what matters is if you could have 
done something to avoid the outcome. But we can also make sense of me 
saying to you “this president is there in part because of you” in other cir-
cumstances, namely those where your mere involvement is what matters. 
(These situations can be either positive or negative—we could be assigning 
either credit or blame, or encouraging either celebration or repentance).
17Heath White, in his treatment of theological determinism and petitionary prayer, picks 
out what is, as far as I can tell, basically this good of involvement when he says that God 
gives those whose prayers he answers “the dignity of causality” (in Pascal’s phrase), giving 
us “the privilege of being part of the solution to the world’s ills in a special way.” White, Fate 
and Free Will, 36. It is also plausible to interpret Cohoe, in “God, Causality, and Petitionary 
Prayer,” 30, as picking this good out when he speaks of the good of “contributing to the 
good of other created beings,” especially once he makes it clear later in the essay that such 
contribution doesn’t require that your requests “make the difference” as to whether God 
does what you request. What is original about my treatment is not the good I’m pointing 
out, but the way in which this particular good interacts with interest-relative explanation 
and omnirationality.
18I think Cohoe, in “God, Causality, and Petitionary Prayer,” 40, identifies another good 
that would probably have the same result with respect to omnirationality as the good of 
involvement: the good of friendship (or perhaps a broader category of relationship), which 
leads us to care about whether God takes our requests into account when he acts. If we ask 
“did God do X because I asked?” with that good of friendship primarily in mind, I suspect the 
mere fact that he took our request into account would be sufficient for the answer to be “yes.” 
So there are probably other goods than involvement which could be used to make my point.
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Or consider being a part of a large movement advocating for some 
important political change, or being a part of a large-scale rescue effort 
in response to a natural disaster. Perhaps all you do (perhaps all you can 
do) is bring coffee and a few words of encouragement to the protesters, 
the lobbyists, the rescue workers, or whoever is more directly involved in 
the effort, out of a desire to be a part of the movement and see it succeed. 
It may well be true that the movement’s success did not depend on your 
contributions; they would have been easily replaced, or just as likely the 
movement would have succeeded even without replacements for those 
particular sorts of contributions. Again, sometimes it makes sense to say 
that that change wasn’t made (or those people weren’t rescued) because 
of you, such as when you are trying to position yourself as some kind 
of hero. But other times it does make sense to say that the change was 
made, or the people rescued, because of you. For example, when it comes 
time to participate in celebrations of what was accomplished, or when 
the people benefitted thank those who contributed, it can be accurate for 
you to think to yourself “this is something we did,” and include yourself 
in that “we.”
Another class of examples is team sports. Consider the contribution 
of individual members of, say, a basketball or football team to the whole. 
Often the individual members’s contributions don’t make the difference, 
and the best contrastive explanations don’t refer to them. I  scored four 
points and got one rebound in five minutes of action; we won by 25. Or 
maybe I didn’t get into the game at all but only played on the scout team 
in practice, preparing the team’s starters by running the opposing team’s 
plays; and perhaps the team even would have won without that sort of 
preparation. But still in some very important sense, I was a part of our vic-
tory.19 In one sense, we didn’t win because of me, and you should tell me 
that if I start boasting. In another sense, we won, in part, because of my 
contributions, which you should tell me when I am feeling left out of the 
team’s accomplishment.
There are cases of petitionary prayer that are hard to make sense of 
without this less restrictive sense of answered prayer. One, unsurpris-
ingly, is collective prayer, since it makes the connection to collective action 
explicit, and therefore brings the good of involvement in the projects of oth-
ers—projects that could and would succeed without your contribution—
to the forefront. In the Abrahamic traditions, God is thought to answer 
not only the prayers of individuals but the prayers of groups, of nations 
19If my memory serves me correctly, San Antonio Spurs coach Greg Popovich, in his 
speech to his team in the locker room following their victory in the 2014 NBA finals, made 
the point that everyone in the organization “had a piece of this,” and he meant to include 
even those (like assistant trainers and student interns and the like) in the organization who 
didn’t directly impact the victory and without whom the victory would still have been won. 
But because they were a part of the effort, they “had a piece” of it. I think this is deeply right, 
and an excellent example of the good of involvement that I’m pointing out.
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and peoples.20 If that is true, then God answers collective prayer, and it 
would be accurate for members of those groups to believe that God had 
answered their prayers. But very likely their individual prayers would 
not count as having been answered if we apply a strong “difference-mak-
ing” criterion like the counterfactual test or Davison’s contrastive-reasons 
account. If God is responding to the prayers of a whole nation, probably 
no one person’s praying or failing to pray made the difference, such that 
God wouldn’t have granted the request without that prayer, or such that 
the prayer is an essential part of a true contrastive explanation of why God 
did what he did rather than something else. The account I’ve outlined has 
no such trouble: if what you care about is just being involved—which is 
likely already the case, since this is already an example of collective action 
even before we bring God into it—it would be true for you to say that your 
prayers have been answered because the fact that they are one reason for 
God’s action is sufficient to make you involved in that way.21
Another case of petitionary prayer that is hard to make sense of with-
out this less restrictive sense of answered prayer is prayer for things 
which God has already promised to bring about.22 Eleonore Stump’s sem-
inal article that began the contemporary debate over petitionary prayer 
actually began specifically with the Lord’s Prayer, and focused on the first 
few petitions which, strikingly, seem to be things that God has already 
promised to bring about.23 These pose a problem that is deeper than the 
standard problem for any petitionary prayer, the worry that “if it was 
good enough to do, God would have done it anyway.” That puzzle can 
be solved by identifying difference-making prayer. But in the first part of 
the Lord’s Prayer, we find God commanding people to pray for things he 
seems committed to bringing about anyway, because he has already prom-
ised to bring them about. The “prayer can make the difference” response 
is a less plausible take on these petitions. But divine omnirationality and 
the good of involvement can yield a plausible account of what is going on 
20God deals collectively with groups and with humanity as a whole all through the Bible. 
For some specific examples, see Exodus 3:19 and the many examples of God’s responding 
to national repentance and answering collective prayers for forgiveness and mercy in the 
books of Judges, Daniel, and Nehemiah. (Thanks to Jay Bruce and Nick Meriwether for these 
suggestions.)
21Davison explicitly and carefully limits his account of answered prayer to individual 
rather than collective prayer, and so I am not so much objecting here directly to his account 
of answered prayer as showing its limitation. The contrastive-reasons and counterfactual 
tests for answered prayer seem built with individual prayer in mind and falter when applied 
to cases of collective prayer. I think what this discussion helps us to see is that this limitation 
actually interferes with our understanding even of individual prayer. One possible lesson 
here is that many of the sorts of things that should be said about collective prayer can be 
said even of individual prayer, since individual prayer to God asking him to do something 
in the world is either a kind of collective action with God or at least analogous to collective 
action with God.
22The inspiration for this line of argument is Heath White’s discussion in Fate and Free 
Will, 33–36.
23Stump, “Petitionary Prayer.”
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here: God is commanding us to pray for things he already has a decisive 
reason to do (which are his greatest works, long promised), so that he can 
involve us in his doing of them.
Now we can revisit Davison’s cases with this good of involvement in 
mind and the corresponding sense of “answered prayer.” As it turns out, 
the original intuition on one of the cases can be explained from this per-
spective, the second case is underdescribed, and I am simply willing to 
reject the original verdict on the third case (again, so long as the good of 
involvement is kept in mind).
Tree-trimming. In the tree-trimming case where my neighbor’s request 
gave me only a very small reason to trim the tree, my neighbor and I prob-
ably shouldn’t care enough about each other’s yard-care projects to regard 
mere involvement in them, even if we just have a tiny role, as worth desir-
ing. So the fact that the neighbor’s request plays such a small role in my 
decision to trim the tree does mean that I shouldn’t care about that part 
of the explanation of the tree-trimming action. So there is no important 
sense in which I trimmed the tree because of his request, because the good 
of involvement isn’t significant enough to make such a small explanatory 
role for his request relevant to note.
Now, we could adjust the example so that the good of involvement 
would become a larger good, and in that case I think our intuition might 
change if we keep that good in mind. One way would be to involve team-
mates or family members, like imagining my small son asking me to trim 
it, because he wants to be a part of my life and a part of taking care of our 
home. In that case, then perhaps the fact that I did take my son’s request 
into account, even if I gave it small weight, should be something he should 
care about, and so it may be true for him to believe that in that sense I did 
it in part because he asked.
Letter to the mayor. The case of the letter to the mayor, it turns out, is 
underdescribed. It doesn’t have enough information about the context—in 
particular, about why we care whether the mayor passed the law because 
of the letter. Here are a few different ways of spelling it out. (1) We’re 
engaged in a corruption investigation, and the letter was from a (minor) 
political donor. We want to find out whether the mayor is beholden to his 
financial supporters, or whether he is acting for the public interest. In this 
case, the fact that the letter from the donor played such a minor role in the 
mayor’s motivational structure allows him to say truly “I didn’t pass the 
law because of the letter; I did it for the public good.” (2) We’re engaged in 
an inquiry as to the character of the mayor. Perhaps the mayor is appear-
ing before God in the final judgment; or perhaps he is being examined by a 
pastor or spiritual advisor interested in the state of his soul, and the mayor 
is doing some soul-searching. The letter was from a good man down on 
his luck. We want to find out if the mayor cares properly about individual 
people, and so we want to know if he gave the letter some weight when 
deciding what to do. In this case, so long as the letter did form some part 
(even a very small part) of his motivation, the mayor can say truly “yes, 
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to a certain extent I did pass the law because of the letter.” This second 
variation on the case gets close to focusing on the good of involvement 
I mentioned: if it is the letter-writer who is asking, the letter-writer might 
want to know in order to know whether the mayor cares enough about 
him or respects him enough that his words carried weight with the mayor.
Notice that these two descriptions are compatible with one another and 
so could describe the very same case. The different interests of the inquir-
ers make different aspects of the full explanation relevant. In the first var-
iant, the interest in discovering corruption makes the fact that the mayor 
was going to sign the law anyway the relevant explanatory feature; in the 
second variant, the interest in searching the mayor’s soul for compassion 
for individuals makes the fact that the letter did have some impact, even 
if small and not enough to make the difference as to which action is ulti-
mately taken, the relevant explanatory feature.
Divine conservation. This is the case where I’m willing to deny the 
original intuition. As I’ve been arguing, we need to understand why we 
care whether God has answered our prayers that he would continue to 
sustain the world. If it is because we want to bear a heavy sort of respon-
sibility for the sustenance of the world, then it would need to be true 
that our request made the difference as to whether God continues to 
sustain the world, and of course that isn’t true. So if that is our interest, 
then certainly God did not answer our prayer. But if I keep the good of 
involvement clearly in mind, I lose my intuition that God couldn’t have 
continued to sustain the world because of my prayer that he do so. Why 
can’t I be involved in that way in his sustenance of the world? Suppose 
I’m moving a heavy piece of furniture, and I  allow my three-year-old 
son to help (yes, I know, disregard the safety concerns), by holding one 
corner with all of his strength. His strength isn’t enough to make a differ-
ence one way or the other; the furniture doesn’t so much as move when 
he loses his balance and removes his hands. Nevertheless, he is involved 
in the moving of the furniture, and it is legitimately important to him 
that he is. We could even modify this case to make all the causal influ-
ence run through me and my reasons to act: suppose the way he helps 
is by cheering me on (that’s safer). Even though I’m plenty motivated 
to move the furniture even without his cheers, if his cheers do motivate 
me even a little bit, he is involved in the moving of the furniture. And it 
makes sense to say that the furniture was moved in part because of him. 
Now, it seems to me that it isn’t so implausible that I can be involved 
even in the great divine act of sustaining the creation in that sort of way 
with my prayers. So when I  have the involvement good clearly in my 
mind, I  lose my intuition that God’s sustenance of the world is not an 
answer to my prayer to that effect. That’s just a way in which an omni-
rational God can involve me even in his greatest works. (And, in fact, 
this is exactly what he’s doing in commanding me to pray the first few 
petitions of the Lord’s Prayer.) That’s a spine-chilling, remarkable theo-
logical consequence, not an objection.
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I conclude that there is at least one way around the puzzles of petition-
ary prayer. If the good of involvement with God’s activities is what is kept 
in mind when considering whether God answers prayer, then omniration-
ality allows us to conclude that whenever God brings about something 
that we prayed for (meeting whatever conditions are necessary to give 
him a reason to do it), he did it in part in answer to our prayer. To achieve 
this good of involvement, there is no need for prayer to “make the differ-
ence” in the strong sense that the prayer constitutes a tipping point that 
makes the difference between whether God does what is requested or not; 
it is enough that our prayer makes a difference in the sense that it consti-
tutes one of the reasons on the basis of which he acts. When considering 
prayer from the perspective of this good and the thesis of divine omnira-
tionality, the standard puzzles of petitionary prayer dissolve.
A question may occur at this point to those familiar with the debate 
over petitionary prayer: how is the good that I’ve named involvement 
relate to the good of responsibility to which many have appealed in order 
to solve the puzzles of petitionary prayer? Does this line of thought ulti-
mately belong to the family of responsibility-based defenses against the 
puzzle of petitionary prayer?24 My answer is: I don’t quite know. I have 
two things to say about this. First, there is clearly one tremendous dif-
ference between the defense I’ve outlined and all the extant members of 
the family of responsibility-based defenses: those defenses have all tried 
to argue that the good of the extension of responsibility requires that our 
requests “make the difference” in the strong sense as to whether God does 
what is requested, and have tried to argue that it is a sufficiently great 
good that it gives God reason to act differently depending on whether he 
is petitioned or not. All of the objections to responsibility-based defenses 
have targeted this feature. Since I have not said that the good of involve-
ment requires that our requests make the difference—in fact, I have said 
the opposite—the debate over responsibility-based defenses is basically 
irrelevant to discussion of this one.
Second, I don’t know what the relationship is between the good that 
I’ve pointed out—involvement—and responsibility. One might wonder if 
I am actually disagreeing with responsibility-based defenses by virtue of 
my claim that the good of involvement does not require that our requests 
“make the difference” as to what God does. That would only be so, though, 
if the good of involvement essentially involved the sort of responsibility 
that has been appealed to in the literature. I do not claim that it does, and 
I do not know whether it does. I have picked out the good of involve-
ment not by giving an account of it but by ostension—that is, by using 
examples to point it out. I’ve not given an analysis of it, a set of conditions 
both necessary and sufficient for it, because I  do not know what those 
may be. It does seem to me from the examples I’ve used that the good of 
24For a summary discussion of this family of responses, see Davison, Petitionary Prayer, 
Chapter 7.
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involvement is somehow connected to some sort or degree of responsi-
bility, but I do not know how it is connected (whether the connection is 
essential or of some other sort) or to what sort or degree of responsibility 
it is connected. All of that, it seems to me, implies that I am pursuing a 
line of thought quite different than the responsibility-based defenses that 
have so far been tried, and I will leave off further investigation of the rela-
tionship between responsibility and the good I have called involvement.25
4. Other Interests and the Puzzles of Petitionary Prayer
I have concluded that there is at least one way around the puzzles of 
petitionary prayer. This is not to say that all the puzzles of petitionary 
prayer, or even any of the standard puzzles, have been fully solved. Here’s 
why. You need to have a motive for wanting to know whether God might 
answer your (or someone else’s) prayer. This motive provides the context 
for determining the meaning of “because” in the question “might God do 
this because I ask him?” In other words, when you ask, “might God answer 
this prayer?” the proper response must be something along the lines of 
“well, why do you want to know?” If you have no particular motive for 
asking the question—no sense for why you would want to know whether 
God might answer your prayer—then the question has no answer, because 
the question has no determinate meaning. There isn’t enough context to 
determine the meaning of the term “because” in the question “might God 
do this because I asked?” In that case, it might be proper simply to deny 
that the question has an answer at all, or it might be proper to default to 
the only context-independent sort of explanation, full or complete expla-
nation. In that case, it is the answer implied by divine omnirationality that 
is appropriate—if your prayer plays any role at all in God’s reasons for 
acting, then he did what he did in part because you asked.
However, if you have a more particular motive for asking the question, 
then (and only then) might a puzzle of petitionary prayer arise, one which 
might not be solved by omnirationality. After all, I  think the success of 
Davison’s examples do show that we often have other interests in mind 
than the good of involvement when we want to know whether someone 
might respond to our requests, and it is plausible that some of those inter-
ests will apply when we want to know whether God might respond to our 
25The very same two points apply to the defense given by Smith and Yip in “Partnership 
with God,” though it is more tempting in their case to simply disagree with them that “part-
nership with God” requires that our requests “make the difference” in a strong sense as to 
whether God does what we ask. It may be that a kind of partnership with God could be built 
on the good of involvement that I’ve pointed out, in which case Smith and Yip would be 
wrong to say that God would have to withhold goods unless asked in order to enable that 
sort of partnership. I’ll leave that question undecided. If they are right that “partnership with 
God” does require stronger difference-making, then they are picking out a different good 
than I am; if they are wrong, they could be picking out a good that could be constructed from 
the good of involvement (it would have to add the extra vows of partnership they think are 
important for the kind of partnership they are talking about).
152 Faith and Philosophy
requests. And it may well be that some of those interests would require 
our requests to “make the difference” in a stronger sense in order for it to 
turn out to be true that God did what we asked because of our requests.
It is tempting to say at this point that it is one’s motives in offering 
prayers which raise puzzles of petitionary prayer. But it isn’t directly the 
motive one has in offering the prayer that raises the puzzle. It is the motive 
one has for caring whether God might answer one’s prayer. These are not 
automatically equivalent. One might have a motive for offering a prayer 
that doesn’t have to do with wanting it answered: one might be praying 
in obedience to a command, for instance. But the two are connected: if you 
have a reason to care about whether God might answer your prayer, that 
will often be one of the reasons you offer the prayer (because you want 
God to answer it, for that reason). But even this connection is not essential: 
you might have a well-worked out theory about why you should want 
God to answer your prayers, but then find yourself praying in ways that 
don’t really fit your theory or which aren’t actually motivated by your 
theory. So I will sometimes refer to motives we have in offering prayers 
to God, but what is really doing the work (to set the meaning of the term 
“because” in the question “might God do this because I ask him?” and 
to raise a puzzle of petitionary prayer) is the motives we have to care 
whether God might answer our prayers.
Here are just a couple of possible reasons we might have to care about 
whether God might answer our prayers:
(a) The reason I care about whether God might answer my prayer is that if God 
wasn’t going to do what I asked anyway, I want him to change his mind and do 
what I’m asking. I want his priorities to move closer to mine.
(b) The reason I care whether God might answer my prayer is that I want to take 
responsibility in a deeper sort of way for what happens in my world, and 
I think that’s possible if my prayers might make the difference as to what he 
does. I don’t just want to be involved in what God was going to do anyway; 
I want to take a heavier burden of personal responsibility for, say, my neigh-
bor’s well-being and for other things that happen in the world. I want to gradu-
ate from child to something like a co-regent with or sub-ruler under God of the 
world.26
(c) The reason I care whether God might answer my prayer is that I want a real 
friendship with God, and I  think that may require for me to have some real 
autonomy in deciding what I want him to give me, so that God doesn’t over-
whelm me by forcing his own will on me or turn into my personal cosmic vend-
ing machine.
We could go on. If any of these reasons for caring about whether God 
might answer our prayers are legitimate, then they raise the puzzles of 
26This may sound theologically objectionable to some, but it seems to me there is plenty of 
theological justification for this sort of attitude, at least in the Jewish and Christian traditions. 
The best literary representation of which I know of this idea that humans can and ought 
to think of themselves as rulers under God can be found in the scenes near the end of C.S. 
Lewis’s Perelandra.
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petitionary prayer. If any of these are your interest in asking the question 
“might God answer my prayer?” then your prayer probably would have to 
“make the difference” in some strong sense as to whether God did what 
you asked for your prayer to count as answered. And then it makes sense 
to ask why God wouldn’t just do the best thing whether or not he is asked. 
Divine omnirationality, therefore, doesn’t dissolve the puzzles of petition-
ary prayer which are raised by these (and other) interests people have in 
bringing petitionary prayers to God.
I’m not going to evaluate each of these reasons to care about whether 
God answers your prayers. I will argue, however, that the debate over the 
puzzles for petitionary prayer that are raised by these reasons for caring 
whether God might answer prayer looks very different in light of divine 
omnirationality. It is a much less significant threat to the widespread reli-
gious practice of offering petitionary prayers.
To begin, notice that these descriptions of reasons to care about whether 
God answers your prayers correspond to standard defenses against the 
puzzle of petitionary prayer. The first one I listed corresponds very closely 
to the solution to the puzzle of petitionary prayer offered by Martin 
Pickup; his idea is that God doesn’t actually have requiring reasons to 
make the best world that he can, and so our prayers might actually give 
him reason to make our world better than it would otherwise have been.27 
The second corresponds to the responsibility-based defenses that are com-
mon.28 The third corresponds to Eleonore Stump’s original solution to the 
puzzle of petitionary prayer.29 There is a reason for this correspondence: if 
there is a relationship between your requests and God’s actions that you 
have a good reason to care about, then that is something God has a reason 
to care about as well.
In other words, if we approach the question of answered prayer in 
the value-based way I’ve suggested that takes divine omnirationality 
into account, then the puzzles of petitionary prayer take on a kind of 
27This is an oversimplification. To elaborate a bit: Pickup gives a few different reasons to 
think God isn’t obligated to make the best overall world he can, so that our prayers could 
influence him to create a world that is better in some respect. One has to do with the possi-
bility of things of incommensurable value, another with the fact that God’s ethics may not 
require him to create the best overall world. One of the sources he cites is Mark Murphy’s 
discussion of God’s ethics, whose idea is that created things aren’t actually intrinsically good 
in the strongest sense, but have their goodness by “participation,” that is, by virtue of some 
relation to God. So creation doesn’t actually add any goodness over and above that which 
exists in God. Therefore, no matter how God creates the world, there won’t be more or less 
“total goodness” considered absolutely, which means that God doesn’t have a requiring rea-
son to create the world one way rather than another, or to create rather than not to create. 
This may allow our prayers to give God extra reason to make the world “better” at least in 
the sense of having more participated goodness in it (which is not the same as having “more 
goodness” in absolute terms). See Pickup, “Answer to Our Prayers,” and Murphy, God’s Own 
Ethics.
28See, for example, Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, and Daniel and Frances 
Howard-Snyder, “The Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer.”
29Stump, “Petitionary Prayer.”
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self-solving character. To identify a reason to care about answered prayer 
that restricts what counts as answered prayer beyond what omniration-
ality allows us to say, we need to identify some good achieved by prayer 
that requires our prayers to “make the difference” in a stronger way. But 
if we’ve identified such a good, we’ve already given an answer to the typ-
ical puzzles of petitionary prayer: we’ve already said what reason God 
would have for doing things in response to our requests that he wouldn’t 
otherwise do. In other words, to identify an interest in answered prayer on 
which the puzzles of petitionary prayer arise is, typically, precisely thereby 
to identify a solution to those puzzles.
An example from the literature will help here. Consider the debate 
over responsibility-based defenses of petitionary prayer between Davison 
on the one hand and Swinburne and the Howard-Snyders on the other.30 
Swinburne says that it is good for us to take responsibility for each other 
and for what happens in the world, and God can extend our responsi-
bility by refraining from doing certain things unless we pray for them. 
Davison objects: he says that God couldn’t actually extend our responsi-
bility that way, since we’d have to be able to foresee whether God would 
answer a prayer of ours for us to be responsible for what happens, and so 
God’s refraining from doing things unless asked doesn’t actually achieve 
this good. The Howard-Snyders reply by saying (among other things): 
sometimes even if we can’t foresee what will happen as a result of our 
actions, we can still be responsible for what happens. Davison objects fur-
ther to that line of thought, but then adds another objection that he doubts 
whether the “extension of responsibility” is a sufficiently good thing, since 
after all God could “extend our responsibility” in a similar way by making 
us more powerful or more knowledgeable, which he declines to do. And 
the debate goes on.
Here’s the point I want to make about this debate. Given what I’ve said 
so far about divine omnirationality and answered prayer, I  don’t think 
we’ll end up with a significant challenge to the practice of petitionary 
prayer regardless of who wins this debate and others like it. Suppose the 
Howard-Snyders prove correct. In that case, we’ve raised a puzzle about 
petitionary prayer and solved it. Suppose Davison proves correct. In that 
case, we’ve shown that the puzzle doesn’t have a solution. But I  think 
we’ve also precisely thereby gained reason to reject the conditions which 
gave rise to the puzzle in the first place. The puzzle only arose because 
in our practice of petitionary prayer we wanted to take a strong sort of 
responsibility for the course of things, and our prayers would have to 
“make the difference” in a strong sense as to what God does for us to take 
that strong sort of responsibility. The lesson I take from Davison’s argu-
ments, assuming they are successful, is this: no, I shouldn’t want to take 
such a strong sort of responsibility for others in my practice of petitionary 
prayer, because that’s impossible and wouldn’t be a good thing anyway. 
30A summary of this debate can be found in Davison, Petitionary Prayer, 118–124.
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But if I adopt that conclusion, I’ve lost my reason to care in the first place 
whether my requests “make the difference” in the strong sense as to what 
God does. But if I’ve lost my reason to care about that, the whole puzzle 
never arises for me. Now to the objector who says “God would do the best 
thing whether you ask or not” I  can respond: “well, why should I  care 
whether my requests make the difference as to what God does? Didn’t 
you just argue persuasively that there aren’t good enough reasons to care 
about that?” Now, obviously this line of thought only works if we can 
make sense of offering petitionary prayers to God without caring about 
whether our request “makes the difference” in a strong sense; in other 
words, it depends on something like the divine omnirationality solution 
I’ve been defending. But given the divine omnirationality solution as a 
baseline, the standard criticisms of defenses of petitionary prayer actu-
ally dissolve the problems those defenses are supposed to solve in the 
first place.
I want to stop short of saying that every challenge to the general prac-
tice of petitionary prayer will be self-solving in this way, since I  don’t 
know how to construct an in-principle argument for that claim. I’ll con-
tent myself with saying that the standard or usual puzzles for petitionary 
prayer that have been the subject of debate recently among Anglophone 
philosophers have this property. But I will say that it is rather challeng-
ing to imagine what form a puzzle would have to take in order not to be 
self-solving in this way. As far as I can tell, one would have to argue both 
that (a) we have a legitimate interest (more precisely, an interest that we 
should have and ought not to give up) by our own lights in wanting God 
to answer our prayers, an interest that would only be satisfied if those 
prayers might be able to “make the difference” in a strong sense as to 
what God does, and (b) that interest could never actually provide God 
with a good enough reason to do things differently depending on what 
he is asked to do. In that case, we would have a religious practice that, by 
our own lights, we ought to engage in but which, also by our own lights, 
cannot be successful. That would constitute a real puzzle for religious 
practitioners. But it seems to me rather easy, in the abstract, for the reli-
gious practitioner in question simply to deny that this gap (between our 
interests and God’s) exists—to insist, for instance, that she actually ought 
to give up the interest in question in the face of the fact that the interest 
doesn’t hold for God. So while I don’t rule out the possibility of generating 
such a difficult puzzle (by arguing that our interests and God’s come apart 
in this particular way), I conclude that it would be difficult to do so. Very 
likely, therefore, the puzzles of petitionary prayer will be self-solving in 
the way that I have argued.
So even though divine omnirationality doesn’t dissolve all of the puz-
zles of petitionary prayer, it does have the result that most of the ways of 
raising the puzzle of petitionary prayer will contain within themselves 
the solution to the very puzzle they raise. Given what I’ve said about 
divine omnirationality, the debate over the puzzles of petitionary prayer, 
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though not eliminated entirely, ought to take on a different sort of charac-
ter. Instead of thinking of them as challenges to the general religious prac-
tice of offering petitionary prayers to God, we ought instead to think of 
them as debates over the appropriate reasons to care whether God might 
answer our prayers. If there is an interest we have that motivates us to 
pray, and which requires that our prayers possibly make the difference (in 
a strong sense) as to what God does, then that interest raises the puzzles 
of petitionary prayer. And if it turns out upon closer examination that this 
interest couldn’t ever actually give God a good enough reason to act dif-
ferently depending on whether we pray, then we should probably infer 
that our interest is illegitimate and that we ought to pray with a differ-
ent motive. The debates over puzzles of petitionary prayer then become 
debates among religious practitioners as to the appropriate motives for 
offering prayers to God—the appropriate reasons to care whether God 
might answer such prayers—rather than debates between religious prac-
titioners and critics of the whole practice.
Whatever the fate of those interests we have in offering petitionary 
prayers whose satisfaction requires that our requests might make the dif-
ference as to what God does, there always remains another interest which 
does not require that our requests make the difference as to what he does. 
If our desire in petitioning God is simply to be involved in what God is 
doing, then the divine attribute of omnirationality implies that it is always 
true that God answers our prayers when he does the good things we ask 
of him.31
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